Conceptualizing intelligence in its biological context, as the expression of manifold adaptations, compels a rethinking of measuring this characteristic in humans, relying also on animal studies of analogous skills. Mental manipulation, as an extension of object manipulation, provides a continuous, biologically based concept for studying G as it pertains to individual differences in humans and other species.

At the end of the verses 44th, 45th, and 47th of the Surat al-Māʾida, it is seen that those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are described as unbelievers, oppressors, and fāsiqs with the general expression. Especially in verse 44th of the surah, the fact that those who do not judge by Allah's revelations are characterized as misbelievers has been a subject of debate since the early period. Many different opinions have been expressed by the mufassirs about (...) who are included in this scope, who are the addressees of the verse, whether the” kufr” here is blasphemy in the form of denying Allah and leaving the religion, or is it a different type of “kufr”. As it is understood from the information in the sources regarding the asbāb al-nuzūl of these verses were revealed as the Jews destroyed the provisions set by Allah in the Torah, changed them with various ways, and discriminated between people in various ways and applied them. With the relevant verses in Sūrah al-Māʾida, all these injustices, lawlessness, and unfairness were made away and the Jews who committed them were strongly criticized. In this regard, it is seen that some commentators have devoted themselves to the reason for the verdict of the relevant verses and interpreted the characterizations in the verse as infidels, cruel, and fāsiqs as covering only the Jews who committed these acts. However, even if the information about the contents of the relevant verses shows that these verses are about the Jews, this does not mean that the scope of the verse should be limited to them. Because both the universality of the messages of the Qur'an in general and the fact that the address in the verses came in a public way do not allow these provisions to be allocated only to a certain group. In addition, according to the rules of istinbat, the fact that the reason for making a religious provision is specific does not prevent the generalization of it. When considered within the framework of the principles we have explained, it becomes clear that narrowing down the provisions of the verses by allocating them only to a certain group is not a correct approach. In this article, it is aimed to draw attention to the richness of meaning that emerges when the relevant verses are evaluated in terms of the types of indications in the fiqh method. When the verses within our subject are evaluated in terms of the types of indications, it is seen that these verses indicate that the implementation of a provision in force cannot be avoided. In the relevant verses, it's concluded that important principles and rules of law such as the realization of justice, the rule of law, equality before the law, no one's being privileged in the sight of the law, the powers of the head of state are limited, that there is no place for ijtihad where Allah's clear judgment exists. (shrink)

-- -- ḥeleḳ 3. Shaʻar ha-teḥinah -- ḥeleḳ 4. Shaʻar ha-segulot.

It is widely accepted that a notion of 'focus', more or less as conceived of in Jackendoff , must be incorporated into our theory of grammar, as a means of accounting for certain observed correlations between prosodic facts and semantic/pragmatic facts. In this paper, we put forth the somewhat radical idea that the time has come to give up this customary view, and eliminate 'focus' from our theory of grammar. We argue that such a move is both economical and fruitful.Research (...) over the years has revealed that the correlations between prosody, 'focus', and the alleged semantic/pragmatic effects of focus are much less clear and systematic than we may have initially hoped. First we argue that this state of affairs detracts significantly from the utility of our notion of 'focus', to the point of calling into question the very motivation for including it in the grammar. Then we look at some of the central data, and show how they might be analyzed without recourse to a notion of 'focus'. We concentrate on the effect of pitch accent placement on discourse congruence, and the choice of 'associate' for the so-called 'focus sensitive' adverb only. We argue that our focus-free approach to the data improves empirical coverage, and begins to reveal patterns that have previously been obscured by preconceptions about 'focus'. (shrink)

This paper argues that functionalist metasemantic views, such as Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism, face a Euthyphro challenge. The challenge, put roughly, is this: functionalist metasemantic views reverse the order of explanation. According to such views, representational mental states have the contents that they do partly because they play certain roles in our mental lives. According to an intuitive picture of the roles that representational mental states play in our mental lives, however, these states play the roles they do partly (...) because they have the contents that they do. Since explanations—even partial ones—are asymmetric (call this principle ‘the Euthyphro Principle’), we can’t accept both this intuitive picture and a functionalist metasemantics. Hence, we should reject all versions of the latter. This paper can be seen as an attempt to better articulate an intuition that has been suggested in various forms in the literature. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it shows that functionalist metasemantic views imply certain ‘partly because’ claims. Second, it argues for the Euthyphro Principle. Third, it defends the intuitive picture of representational mental states and shows that it implies ‘partly because’ claims that conflict with those made by functionalist metasemantic views. Finally, it considers ways of relaxing the intuitive picture and finds them all wanting. (shrink)

kerekh 1. Av-Hanaḳah -- kerekh 2. Haskamah mi-daʻat-Ṭeḥol -- kerekh 3. Ṭerefah-Milah -- kerekh 4. Mimun ha-refuʼah-Sodiyut refuʼit -- kerekh 5. Sikun ʻatsmi-Ḳaṭan -- kerekh 6. Reʼot-Torat ha-musar.

This paper questions the fairness of our current tort-law regime and the philosophical underpinnings advanced in its defense, a theory known as corrective justice. Fairness requires that the moral equality and responsibility of persons be respected in social interactions and institutions. The concept of luck has been used by many egalitarians as a way of giving content to fairness by differentiating between those benefits and burdens that result from informed choice and those that result from fate or fortune. We argue (...) that the theory of corrective justice, along with its institutional embodiment of tort law, is at odds with an egalitarian commitment to fairness because it allows luck an unjustifiable role in determining dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and dissimilar compensation for similar losses to bodily integrity. Many egalitarian political theorists have also recognized, if not defended, the notion of distinct forms of justice, namely corrective, retributive, and distributive. Although theorists of these different forms of justice have been concerned with negating unfair luck inside the operations of each form of justice, there has been little attention to the way in which luck operates to sort cases into each form of justice. We claim that there is a significant way in which luck operates to subject different people to principles of corrective, retributive, and distributive justicewhich flies in the face of the egalitarian value of fairness. After surveying the arguments put forward by theorists defending a categorical distinction between corrective justice and retributive and distributive principles, we argue that although analytical distinctions can be made between different forms of justice (although, we also suggest that the distinctions are not as sharp as some commentators suggest), there is no good reason to defend an acoustic separation between these forms of justice when doing so creates unfair outcomes. (shrink)

"מבע אנתרופולוגי אל העולם החרדי בישראל, אל האתרים שבהם חרדים מטפלים בחרדים הסובלים מהפרעות נפשיות". -- מפרסום ההוצאה.

This paper connects the debate regarding perceptual representation of high-level properties and the debate regarding non-conceptual perceptual representation. I present and defend a distinction between representationally-complex properties and properties that are simpler to represent and offer ways of assessing whether a property is representationally complex. I address conditions under which such a property might be non-conceptually represented and conclude that most representationally-complex properties are simply too complex to be non-conceptually represented. Thus, most mental states that represent representationally-complex properties must be (...) conceptual. This conclusion is relevant for a variety of philosophical theories (perception, ethics, emotions, pain) and is especially dramatic with respect to accounts according to which a mental state can non-conceptually represent such properties. As a test case for applying my argument I consider a group of such accounts: non-conceptual perceptual views of emotions, which my argument entails are false. I end by considering the implications my argument has for different theories. -/- . (shrink)

Śiḥot maran ha-Mashgiaḥ Mohari Leṿinshṭain, zatsal -- Ḥidushe torato ʻa. Mas. B.ḳ. ṿe-liḳuṭim -- Leḳeṭ mi-maʼamraṿ mi-moreshet Daṿid Heber ṿe-ʻinyene ha-shaʻah.

This paper discusses and provides a tentative model of a firm for purposes of accounting. The paper first presents the neo-classical capital circulation model of the firm—a model that has been an integral part of Finnish business economics and accounting education for at least half a century. During the same period the stakeholder model has become an alternative model of the firm in Scandinavia. These models have represented two alternatives to define the firm in education. In this paper we try (...) to combine these two models to provide a more comprehensive picture of the firm, especially from the accounting education perspective. An earlier version of this model was presented in 1995 in a book edited by Juha Näsi. Stakeholders with business transactions were seen to be crucial to firms and were categorized as primary in the 1995 model. In addition to stakeholders, a number of stakeholder issues were illustrated in the stakeholder model serving accounting as an educational framework. In this paper the earlier model has been updated, taking into account the current globalization and other developments in the business world. (shrink)